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Excess savings and rising capital inflows—especially since the early 2000s—
gave Asia ample liquidity with lower borrowing costs. This would spur domes-
tic demand and growth, helping begin the process of rebalancing the region’s 
economic structure. As this happened, the behavior of economic agents—banks, 
firms, and households—also changed. The preference toward investing in financial 
assets increased. This added the risks of procyclicality discussed in previous chap-
ters. Based on flow-of-fund analysis, we showed in Chap. 2 that the rise in bank 
assets in emerging Asia was driven by a surge in noncore liabilities associated with 
capital inflows. While this raised some concerns over its impact on financial stabil-
ity, the precise extent and nature of the effect remains to be investigated. To what 
extent does the rise in noncore bank liabilities threaten Asia’s financial stability, 
and how does it influence the effectiveness of standard monetary policy?
Compared with other emerging markets, Asia’s noncore liabilities as a share 
of total liabilities remain relatively small. But their rapid rise and higher ratio to 
gross domestic product (GDP) may have reduced the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. When the policy is overstressed by continuing to raise the interest rates with 
limited effect on noncore liabilities, we show in this chapter that it can produce 
unintended side effects such as elevating probabilities of bankruptcy. Hence, mak-
ing financial stability an additional goal would require an additional policy instru-
ment. As done in the previous chapters, here we continue to argue that an effective 
macroprudential policy is needed to supplement standard monetary policy.
After analyzing the relative size of noncore bank liabilities, we analyze the 
emerging comovement between bank credit and noncore liabilities. This is done 
using a credit model that takes into account the financial structure of lenders and 
borrowers (credit channel hypothesis). We then test the effectiveness of interest 
rate policy, followed by its impact on the probability of bankruptcies occurring.
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4.1  Bank-Led Flows, Noncore Liabilities,  
and Credit Growth
While push and pull factors work to fuel capital flows, those since early 2000 were 
driven more by the push factor. United States (US) and Eurozone interest rates 
fluctuated sharply during the 2000s. After falling precipitously in 2001–2003 in 
response to the 2000 recession and the 11 September 2001 political shock, the US 
Federal Funds rate began to rise, increasing more than fivefold by the end of 2007. 
But the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 dramatically reversed the trend, push-
ing rates down to as low as 0.25 %. The European interest rates essentially fol-
lowed the pattern (Fig. 4.1).
Global liquidity conditions have changed since (Fig. 4.2). Massive amounts of 
capital shifted from advanced economies to emerging markets.1 Emerging Europe 
and Asia were among the biggest recipients. This is the first phase of global liquid-
ity. Much of these inflows were intermediated through banks (bank-led flows). As 
these should appear as bank liabilities, any volatility would likely have ramifications 
for bank balance sheets—implying the risk of procyclicality. During the 2008/2009 
global financial crisis, these flows were briefly interrupted. But after mid-2010, 
large flows returned. This time they were predominantly channeled through capital 
1
 Mckinnon (2012) argued that the easy money policy in advanced economies provokes global 
monetary instability through capital flows led by “carry traders” who exploit interest rate dif-
ferentials across countries. He further noted the policy was also less effective than originally 
thought in generating recovery (e.g., in the US). Azis (2010) also argued that a premature US 
recovery would unlikely be sustainable. Rather than forcing a quick recovery, structural changes 
in the US financial system were needed more.
Fig. 4.1  Interest rates—United States (US), Europe. Source European Central Bank and US 
Federal Reserve
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markets (debt-led flows), including local currency (LCY) bond markets. The push 
came from the elevated risk and falling yields in the US following the unprece-
dented quantitative easing (QE) by the US Federal Reserve (US Fed). QE essen-
tially involves large-scale asset purchase to halt the precipitous fall in asset prices. 
After adjusted twice, by late December 2012, monthly purchases reached 
$85  billion (Fig. 4.3). Thus, the second phase of global liquidity began. The nature 
and protagonist of capital flows changed and so did the impending risks.2
How significant is the link between bank-led flows and noncore liabilities? 
Figure 4.4 summarizes this link for emerging Asia. As the cumulative change 
(increase) of bank-led flows surged before the global financial crisis, so did 
 noncore bank liabilities. When they dropped off during the crisis, the cumulative 
change of noncore liabilities also declined, before surging back from 2009 to 
2012.3 The US Fed announcement over the possibility of policy normalization and 
QE tapering in mid-2013 rattled several emerging Asian markets. Together with 
the growing expectation that recovery in advanced economies was imminent, it led 
to capital outflows and another round of volatility. As shown in Fig. 4.4, bank-led 
flows fell during 2012–2014, causing noncore liabilities to fall as well. Clearly, 
2
 As discussed in Chap. 2, debt-led flows and bank-led flows have been the most volatile among 
all types of capital flows.
3
 We argued in Chap. 3 that the exact dividing line between core and noncore liabilities highly 
depends on the financial system in question, its degree of openness, and financial market and 
institutional development. Retail household deposits would be a good first conjecture in defining 
core liabilities. Given data limitations, however, here we define noncore liabilities based on the 
claim holder, or meaning the total liabilities less retail/household deposits.
Fig. 4.2  Gross capital flows by type—emerging markets. Source Institute of International 
Finance
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Fig. 4.3  Quantitative easing—United States Federal Reserve Assets Outstanding ($ trillion). 
















2000 – 2007 2007– 2009 2009 – 2012 2012 – 2014*
Direct Investment Portfolio and debt-led flows Bank-led flows
Official inflows Banks' noncore liabilities
Capital flows Noncore Liabilities
Fig. 4.4  Capital inflows and noncore liabilities—emerging Asia (cumulative change, $ billion). 
Asterisk (*) figures are IIF estimate (2013) and IIF forecast (2014). Notes Emerging Asia 
refers to China, People’s Republic of; India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; and Thailand. Noncore liabilities data do not include India and the Philippines. 
Bank-led flows = Net disbursements from commercial banks (excluding credits guaranteed 
or insured under credit programs of creditor governments). This generally includes bond pur-
chases by commercial banks. Portfolio and debt-led flows = Equity investment and net external 
financing provided by all other private creditors. The latter includes flows from nonbank sources 
into bond markets, as well as deposits in local banks by nonresidents other than banks. It also 
includes credit by suppliers (excluding credits guaranteed or insured under credit program of 
creditor governments), identified private placements of debt securities, and other financial secu-
rities issued in local or foreign currencies. Finally, it includes estimated interest payments due 
but not paid and estimated payments flows with private creditors other than commercial banks 
 resulting from discounted debt transactions. Source IIF and national sources
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bank-led flows have been the major driver behind the increase in noncore liabili-
ties during that period (see Appendix for the impact on individual economies).4
To gain a better perspective on the size of bank-led flows, we compare the case 
of emerging Asia with that of emerging Europe (Fig. 4.5).5 Prior to the 1997/1998 
4
 Note that Fig. 4.4 also confirms the different phases of capital flows in emerging Asia, where 
bank-led flows dominate phase 1 and portfolio and debt-led flows dominate phase 2.
5
 Emerging Europe includes Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Republic; Hungary; Latvia; Poland; the 
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Fig. 4.5  Bank flows to emerging economies (% of GDP). Notes Asia includes Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Europe includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Source ADB calculations using 
data from CEIC
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FDI foreign direct investment
Notes
1. Emerging Europe refers to Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, 
Turkey, and Ukraine. Emerging Asia refers to Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and 
Thailand
2. Episodes are based on 1 standard deviation (SD) band of gross capital inflows and outflows
3. Surge episode = if the year-on-year level change of gross inflows (based on a 4-quarter moving sum) 
increases more than 1 SD above its rolling 8-quarter mean. Stop = if the year-on-year level change of gross 
inflows (based on a 4-quarter moving sum) falls 1 SD below its rolling 8-quarter mean. Retrenchment = year-
on-year level change of gross outflows (based on a 4-quarter moving sum) increases more than 1 SD above its 
rolling 8-quarter mean. Flight = if the year-on-year level change of gross outflows (based on a 4-quarter mov-
ing sum) falls 1 SD below its rolling 8-quarter mean
Source Authors’ calculations
Table 4.1  Episodes of capital flows—selected emerging economies
Led by Emerging Europe Emerging Asia
Gross inflows
Surge
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FDI flows – –
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Debt flows – • 2009Q4-2010Q2
Equity flows – • 2007Q2-Q4




Asian financial crisis, the size of bank-led inflows as a percentage of GDP was 
larger in Asia than in Europe. Afterward—until 2002—flows in emerging Europe 
fluctuated only slightly, while those in Asia fell precipitously. Until a few years 
prior to the global financial crisis, emerging Europe’s share was persistently higher 
than Asia’s. The trend in bank-led outflows was generally similar. But the peak in 
both regions occurred at about the same time, just before the global financial cri-
sis—coinciding with the fall in interest rates in the US and Europe.
As in Asia, volatility in emerging Europe has been also highest for bank-led 
and debt-led flows (Table 4.1). A closer look reveals that the occurrence of “surge” 
of both types of flows occurred more frequently in emerging Europe than in 
emerging Asia.
To the extent both emerging Europe and Asia are highly bank dependent, sig-
nificant volatility in noncore liabilities could pose a serious procyclicality risk. 
This would not happen, however, if the size of noncore liabilities is small, and 
more importantly, if bank assets are not deeply affected by the growth and relative 
change in noncore liabilities. To determine size, we first compare noncore liabili-
ties in Asia with those in emerging Europe. Noncore liabilities in Asia—measured 
as percentage to GDP—have been on an upward trend since the Asian financial 
crisis (Fig. 4.6). But they are smaller than in emerging Europe. Much of the reason 
is because there was a jump in noncore liabilities in Europe driven by increased 
bank-led flows as discussed in Chap. 2. Broken down by economy, by 2012, only 
Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and the Republic of Korea had a higher share of 
noncore liabilities than most of emerging Europe (Fig. 4.7). However, measured 
by the ratio of noncore liabilities to total liabilities, Asia’s share of noncore liabili-
ties is relatively high (Fig. 4.8). It ranged from around 40 % (in Indonesia) to over 
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Fig. 4.6  Noncore bank liabilities—emerging economies (% of gross domestic product). 
Notes Asia includes People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. Europe includes 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
Source ADB calculations using data from CEIC
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To examine whether increases in noncore liabilities mirror increases in total 
assets, we plot the changes in bank assets against changes in noncore and core 
liabilities (Fig. 4.9). The slope of noncore liabilities is higher than that of core 









Fig. 4.7  Noncore bank liabilities—selected emerging economies (% of gross domestic product, 
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Fig. 4.8  Noncore bank liabilities—emerging Asia (% of total liabilities). PRC People’s Republic 
of China; HKG Hong Kong, China; INO Indonesia; JPN Japan; KOR Republic of Korea; MAL 
Malaysia; TAP Taipei,China; THA Thailand. Note Noncore liabilities = Total liabilities less 
retail/household/individual deposits and shareholders’ equity. GFC global financial crisis 
(September 2008–December 2009). Source ADB calculations using data from CEIC
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Flow-of-Fund data in Chap. 2, although here we use the information directly 
obtained from the banking sector with greater detail and more complete data. 
It suggests that the growth in bank assets move more closely with changes in 
noncore liabilities than with changes in core liabilities, confirming the former’s 
increasing importance in bank decisions to expand. Based on the current size 
of noncore liabilities, however, the risk of procyclicality in emerging Asia is 
not yet large. However, given their rising trend and high ratio to total liabilities, 
policy-makers and regulators should monitor developments closely. If left unat-
tended, they could reach a level that could threaten macroeconomic and financial 
stability. 
How did banks allocate spending and investment given their rise in assets? It 
has been shown that bank preference toward investing in risky financial assets 
increased along with the increase in noncore liabilities (Azis and Yarcia 2014). 
Holding financial assets such as bonds and other securities remain high on bank 
balance sheets. At least 50 % of total bank assets are classified as risky. As 
depicted in Fig. 4.10, the increase in risky assets as a percentage of total assets 
after the global financial crisis is noticeable in some economies (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand). Yet, bank credits remain dominant (Fig. 4.11). In 
emerging Asia (except Singapore), loans or bank credits hold the largest share 
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Fig. 4.9  Changes in core and noncore liabilities versus changes in total assets (year-on-year 
change in quarterly levels). Source Authors’ calculations
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But two variables moving in the same direction (credits and noncore liabilities) 
do not necessarily imply causality. To explore further, we construct a credit regres-
sion model with the usual control variables (Table 4.2). In Model-1, the growth of 
the economy, interest rates and bank net worth (to capture banks financial health) 
all determine credit growth. The coefficients are all significant. Controlling for 
these variables, changes in noncore liabilities turn out to be the most significant 
over the period. To the extent government bonds in these economies have been 
growing steadily and provide an alternative source of long-term financing, we 
include changes in bond yields in Model-3. The notion that earnings from higher 
bond yields may “crowd out” credit is tested. While the added variable has the 
expected sign, however, it is insignificant. More importantly, changes in noncore 
liabilities remain the most significant variable.
In modeling credit growth, it has been also hypothesized that credit growth 
is not only determined by the size of a bank’s available funds, but also by 
changes in net worth and external finance premiums of both borrowers and 
lenders. This “credit channel” hypothesis was first postulated by Bernanke 
et al. (1996) and elaborated further in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), Stiglitz 
(2001), among others.
Why does a borrower’s balance sheet matter? When firms act as lenders to 
other firms, credit market friction will likely amplify, propagating real and nomi-
nal shocks to the economy (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2003). In a principal–agent 
problem, credit and investment cycles can be affected in several ways. A depressed 
collateral value of the firm due to falling asset prices, or a worsening balance sheet 
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Fig. 4.10  Risky bank assets (% of total assets). PRC People’s Republic of China; HKG Hong 
Kong, China; INO Indonesia; JPN Japan; KOR Republic of Korea; PHI Philippines; MAL 
Malaysia; SIN Singapore; TAP Taipei,China; THA Thailand. Note Risky assets = Total assets 
less cash, government bonds and fixed assets. GFC global financial crisis (September 2008–
December 2009). Source ADB calculations using data from CEIC
71
imposed by asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders.6 In these cir-
cumstances, there is an incentive for borrowers to pass off risky or potentially bad 
projects as good projects to lenders. This can lower the probability that the loan 
will be repaid, or raise the probability that the firm will go bankrupt. While the 
causality between interest rates and bankruptcies can work both ways, it will 
nonetheless lead to higher costs of external finance (e.g., in higher interest rates).7
6
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrate the effect of lenders’ inability to distinguish between 
different types of borrowers on credit restrictions through the agency cost. Williamson (1987) 
shows that even if lenders know the risk characteristics of different borrowers, there is an incen-
tive for lenders to verify borrower claims and monitor the project, raising costs that can lead to 
credit rationing.
7
 The cost difference between external finance and internally generated finance is a measure of 






Dec-03 Jun-06 Dec-08 Jun-11
Foreign assets Others Loans Total Assets
Indonesia: Bank Assets (Rp trillion)
Sep-13
Notes: Refers to assets of commercial and rural banks.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).









Mar-02 Mar-05 Mar-08 Mar-11
Foreign assets Loans Total assets
PRC: Bank Assets (CNY billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of banking institutions.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).
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Foreign Assets Others Loans Total Assets
Hong Kong, China: Bank Assets 
(HK$ billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of authorized institutions.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).













Jun-98 Jul-01 Aug-04 Sep-07 Oct-10
Foreign assets Other Loans Total assets
Japan: Bank Assets (¥ trillion)
Notes: Refers to assets of licensed banks.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).
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Republic of Korea: Bank Assets 
(KRW trillion)
Notes: Refers to assets of commercial and specialized banks.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).
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Foreign assets Others Loans Total assets
Malaysia: Bank Assets (RM billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of commercial banks.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).













Mar-08 May-09 Jul-10 Sep-11 Nov-12
Others Loans Total assets
Philippines: Bank Assets (Php billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of universal and commercial banks.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).









Mar-04 May-07 Jul-10 Sep-13
Foreign Assets Others Loans Total Assets
Singapore: Bank Assets (S$ billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of domestic banking units (DBUs) and asian currency units. Loans refer to 
domestic loans of DBUs. Other assets refer to Total assets less foreign assets and less loans, cash and 
govt. asset holdings of DBUs only.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).
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Foreign Assets Others Loans Total Assets
Taipei,China: Bank Assets (NT$ billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of domestic banks.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).









Mar-03 Dec-04 Sep-06 Jun-08 Mar-10 Dec-11 Sep-13
Foreign assets Others Loans Total assets
Thailand: Bank Assets (THB billion)
Notes: Refers to assets of other depository corporations.
GFC = Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008–Dec 2009).
Source: ADB calculations using data from CEIC.
GFC
Fig. 4.11  Trends in bank assets—selected Asian economies
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Table 4.2  Regression results on credit growth
GDP = gross domestic product
Note z-values in parenthesis
***Significant at 1 %
**Significant at 5 %
*Significant at 10 %
Source Authors’ calculations
Dependent variable Independent variable (expected sign)
Credit growth Change in:
1. GDP growth (+)
2. Bank net worth (+)
3. Nominal interest rates (−)
4. Noncore liabilities (+)
5. Corporate net worth (+)
6. Share of government bond holdings (−)
7. Government bond yields (−)
 Panel regression results (Credit growth = Y)
Independent variables Model-1 Model-2 Model-3
GDP growth 0.065** 0.0826** 0.026
(1.97) (2.26) (0.84)
Change in banks’ net wortht−1 0.042** 0.049** 0.054***
(2.15) (2.24) (2.95)
Change in nominal interest ratest−1 −0.728*** −0.976*** −1.348***
(−2.62) (−3.12) (−4.10)
Change in noncore liabilitiest−1 0.536*** 0.635*** 0.384***
(18.74) (20.65) (11.3)
Change in corporate net wortht−1 – 0.018 –
–
(0.72) –





Change in government bond yields – – −0.002
–
– (−0.39)
Constant 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.062***
(5.42) (7.32) (9.09)
R-squared
Within 0.484 0.484 0.294
Between 0.897 0.901 0.920
Overall 0.613 0.613 0.551
Why does the financial structure of lenders matter? If a bank holds large 
amounts of nonliquid assets (government bonds) and a considerable number of 
nonperforming loans (higher defaults), then the collateral of financial intermediar-
ies will likely fall. This forces lenders to undertake portfolio reallocations that may 
result in credit rationing. In this situation, at any given interest rate, fewer funds or 
credits are available.
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Following this hypothesis, in Model-2, we include the net worth of borrowers 
represented by corporates and changes in the share of bondholdings in total bank 
assets. The latter is included for two reasons: First, to reduce risks, banks tend to 
accumulate government bonds to comply with the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
rule; and second, the rising share of government bonds may limit a bank’s capac-
ity to lend. As shown in Table 4.2, the two variables have the expected signs, but 
none are significant. More importantly, the coefficient of noncore liabilities is even 
higher than in Model-1 and Model-3 (0.635), and it has a higher degree of signifi-
cance as well. So the result showing that noncore liabilities contribute significantly 
to bank credit growth is robust.
Expanding bank credit itself can be positive if it is in line with the bank’s 
capacity to lend—based on stable sources and real demand. The problem is more 
often than not that credit growth tends to be excessive as liquidity becomes abun-
dant, creating a lending boom that could threaten financial stability. Although we 
argued in Chap. 3 that credit size may not be the best early warning indicator, how 
credit is allocated remains important as a measure of vulnerability. If a consid-
erable portion of credit goes to nonproductive sectors, the growth of monetary 
aggregates will not be in sync with what the economy is able to create. Low pro-
ductivity and high inflation will likely follow this kind of credit growth. Moreover, 
a surge of bank lending to housing and real estate can also contribute to asset bub-
bles and propagating financial instability. Data show most emerging Asian econo-
mies are experiencing this trend. Measured as a percentage of GDP, housing and 
real estate loans have been on the rise, with the highest ratio since the onset of the 











SIN KOR HKG TAP INO MAL PHI THA JPN
End value
Start value % of GDP
Size increase    % of GDP
2000Q1-2003Q41
2003Q4-2008Q3
2008Q3-2013Q1              
Fig. 4.12  Housing and real estate loans (size increase and % of GDP). HKG Hong Kong, China; 
INO Indonesia; JPN Japan; KOR Republic of Korea; PHI Philippines; MAL Malaysia; SIN 
Singapore; TAP Taipei,China; THA Thailand. GDP gross domestic product. Note Uses quarterly 
data. Data unavailable for PRC. Start of data except for INO (2010Q3); JPN (2000Q4); KOR 
(2005Q4); MAL (2006Q1); and PHI (2008Q2). Source ADB calculations using data from CEIC
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4.2  Reassessing Monetary Policy
If the growth of noncore liabilities is the reason behind excessive credit expansion, the 
standard monetary policy of limiting credit growth can be ineffective. A better pol-
icy should then entail supervising and managing noncore liabilities. In Chap. 2, we 
explain that rising noncore liabilities associated with bank-led flows could be highly 
procyclical and constitute an important transmission channel of global liquidity shocks 
to emerging Asia. A likely outcome is that financial cycles will fall out of sync with 
domestic business cycles, meaning the effectiveness of a standard monetary policy can 
be severely curtailed. Similarly, when portfolio and debt-led flows became dominant 
(the second phase), nonbank activities can influence monetary aggregates, in which 
case, a standard monetary policy also tends to be ineffective. The increased preference 
of economic agents toward risky assets further complicates the policy challenge. It is 
on this ground we argue that a supplementary macroprudential policy is needed.
In an environment where monetary policy is effective, credit growth that fuels 
inflation can be controlled by interest rates. With varying degree of success, this 
has been the approach widely used by monetary authorities. The reality, however, 
does not seem to support the intended purpose. Our simple test on the effective-
ness of interest rate policy to lower the inflation rate in emerging Asia shows a 
mixed result at best (Table 4.3). The test summary shows that it is the inflation 
rate that Granger causes the policy rate, not the other way around. This is particu-
larly true in the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; the 
Republic of Korea; the Philippines; and Viet Nam. And we do not find a significant 
relationship between the two variables in India, Malaysia, or Thailand.
The limited capacity of monetary policy to prevent an economy from over-
heating is well known, especially when involving asset and housing prices. 
But controlling credit growth through monetary policy should have been more 
Table 4.3  Summary results on Granger causality between inflation and policy rate
Sample VAR lag order 
(based on AIC 
selection)







PRC 2001.1–2011.7 2 ⁄ ⁄
Hong Kong, 
China
2001.1–2011.7 1 ⁄ x
Indonesia 2005.6–2011.7 2 Only in lag 1 x
India 2001.1–2011.7 2 x x
Korea, Rep. of 2001.1–2011.7 2 ⁄ x
Malaysia 2004.4–2011.7 1 x x
Philippines 2001.1–2011.7 3 ⁄ x
Thailand 2007.7–2011.7 1 x x
Viet Nam 2001.1–2011.7 2 ⁄ x
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straightforward had the financing source for credit been known and influenced by 
interest rates—bank deposits, for example. Yet, the share of nondeposit and other 
noncore liabilities to finance credit has been growing, making it more difficult to 
control. This may explain the ineffectiveness of interest rate policy in containing 
credit growth and hence inflation. A set of institutional factors may have influ-
enced the transmission of interest rates to inflation rates.
Returning our focus to the effect of monetary policy on noncore liabilities, we 
run a model that directly relates interest rates with noncore liabilities. Our inten-
tion is not to capture the causal relationship of the two variables. Instead, we want 
to determine how bank liabilities respond to interest rates (proxied by discount or 
policy rates) in 10 Asian economies. For the reasons described in Chap. 2, dif-
ferent financial institutions may have different capacities of what they can easily 
absorb on their balance sheets in terms of capital inflows. With a wider global net-
work, foreign banks may have greater access to external financing compared with 
domestic banks. Furthermore, there may be differences in domestic and foreign 
bank behavior—as evident in the trend of their noncore liability holdings over the 
years. Thus, the specified model below is separately applied to domestic banks and 
foreign banks for 1998–2012.
Ln(noncore liabilities) = Ln(GDP) + policy rate, where the policy rate variables include 
the current and the lag.
If monetary policy is effective, the coefficients of the interest rate variables would 
be significant and have a negative sign. After controlling for GDP growth, none of 
the policy rate coefficients—when ran against noncore liabilities—are found sig-
nificant (Table 4.4). While the GDP coefficients in all cases are significant (and 
Table 4.4  Regression results on policy rates and bank liabilities
Note z-values in parenthesis
***Significant at 1 %
**Significant at 5 %













Domestic banks Foreign banks
Ln.GDP growth 0.736*** 0.944** 0.446* 0.347**
(3.05) (3.77) (2.14) (1.87)
Policy ratet−1 −0.050 −0.068 −0.058 −0.068
(−0.64) (−0.98) (−0.83) (−1.12)
Policy ratet −0.185 −0.268** −0.085 −0.077
(−1.40) (−2.24) (−0.66) (−0.69)
Constant 10.289*** 10.502*** 11.177*** 14.087***
(4.23) (4.14) (5.38) −7.620
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with the correct sign), the policy rates with and without lag—although negative—
are not. Additionally, the policy rate coefficients for foreign banks’ noncore liabili-
ties are almost zero.
To the extent the effect of monetary policy is more instantaneous than most 
other aggregate demand policies, the current policy rate (without lag) may be 
more appropriate to evaluate. Interestingly, in using this rate, the only policy 
rate coefficient that is significant and with the correct sign is for domestic 
banks’ core liabilities (at the 5 % level). For the rest, the coefficient is either 
insignificant or very small. The results thereby confirm the limited effec-
tiveness of standard monetary policy in containing the growth of noncore 
liabilities.
However, the explanations and fundamental reasons for policy ineffectiveness 
could be easily overlooked. After policy is implemented and the intended goal 
is not met—whether targeted inflation, the size of noncore liabilities, or credit 
growth—there is a tendency to even double efforts by tightening monetary policy 
further. Not only will the goal continue to be unmet—precisely because of the rea-
sons described above—but there is also a risk that the financial health of banks 
deteriorates due to too tightened monetary conditions. We can look at this issue 
further by focusing on how policy rates affect bank wealth—the latter measured 
by the ratio of bank net worth to safe assets.
The following set of explanatory variables is specified. Growth of GDP rep-
resents the overall economic activity that should have a positive contribution 
to bank wealth. Next is bank profitability measured as the difference between 
lending and discount rates. Higher profitability should augment bank wealth too. 
Given the role of equity markets in asset valuation, especially the financial sector 
component of the stock market, a bank’s financial condition is also influenced by 
fluctuations in that market. Improving stock indexes would help improve bank 
net worth. After controlling for these variables, we then test the role of policy 
rates in affecting bank wealth. Given a certain level of interest rate, an increase 
could help improve bank revenues and deposits, thereby augmenting net worth. 
But when bank loans start to suffer, a further interest rate increase will diminish 
bank wealth. To capture these dynamics, we include a squared policy rate in the 
model.
Table 4.5 shows the results. All explanatory variables are significant at least 
at the 5 % level and have the expected signs. What is interesting is that the coef-
ficient for policy rate is positive and significant at the 1 % level, but for the 
squared rate, it is negative and also significant at 1 %. This suggests that up 
to a certain point, raising interest rates will have a positive impact on bank net 
worth. But continuing to raise rates beyond that point would damage a bank’s 
financial health. If left untreated, the deterioration of net worth could lead to 
bankruptcy.
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As potent as monetary policy can be, the increasing role of noncore liabilities 
in influencing credit clearly points to the need for supplementary measures to 
make monetary policy more effective. This is where we strongly argue that pol-
icy needs to be complemented by macroprudential measures. Designed properly, 
these measures could also help reduce the risk of financial vulnerability caused by 
changes in global liquidity.
4.3  Appendix
See Fig. 4.13.
Table 4.5  Regression results on policy rates and bankruptcy
aCalculated as net worth/nonrisky assets
Note z-values in parenthesis
***Significant at 1 %
**Significant at 5 %




Independent variables Full sample








Policy rate, squared −0.007***
(−4.82)
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Fig. 4.13  Bank-led flows and noncore liabilities. Notes (1) Levels (in USD billion) are log-
transformed. (2) Noncore liabilities = Total liabilities less retail/household/individual depos-
its and shareholders’ equity. (3) Regression results are for log-transformed variables (where 
y = noncore liabilities; x = bank-led flows). Source ADB calculations using data from Balance 
of Payments Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and CEIC
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